Abstract. In 1992, Zheng, Pieprzyk and Seberry proposed a one-way hashing algorithm called HAVAL, which compresses a message of arbitrary length into a digest of 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits. It operates in so called passes where each pass contains 32 steps. The number of passes can be chosen equal to 3, 4 or 5. In this paper, we devise a new differential path of 3-pass HAVAL with probability 2 −114 , which allows us to design a second preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL. Our partial keyrecovery attack works with 2 122 oracle queries, 5 · 2 32 memory bytes and 2 96 3-pass HAVAL computations.
Introduction
that demonstrate efficient collision search algorithms for the MD4-family of hash functions. Their proposed neutral-bit and message modification techniques make it possible to significantly improve previous known collision attacks on MD4, MD5, HAVAL, RIPEMD, SHA-0 and SHA-1 [3, 9, 10, 17] , including the second preimage attack on MD4 which finds a second preimage for a random message with probability 2 −56 [18] . There have also been several articles that present attacks on NMAC and HMAC based on the MD4 family. In 2006, Kim et al. first proposed distinguishing and forgery attacks on NMAC and HMAC based on the full or reduced HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 [7] and Contini and Yin presented forgery and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4, -SHA-0, -reduced 34-round SHA-1 and NMAC-MD5 [4] . More recently, full key-recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4, reduced 61-round SHA-1 and NMAC-MD5 were proposed in FC 2007 [8] and in CRYPTO 2007 [6] .
The motivation of this paper is that 1) there are strong collision producing differentials of HAVAL for collision attacks [10, 11] , but no differential of HAVAL has been proposed for second preimage attacks, and 2) there are distinguishing/forgery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-HAVAL [7] , but no key-recovery attack has been proposed. This paper investigates if 3-pass HAVAL and HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL are vulnerable to the second preimage and partial key recovery attacks, respectively. (After our submission, we learned that Hongbo Yu worked independently for her doctoral dissertation [16] on partial key recovery attacks on HAVAL-based HMAC and second preimage attack on HAVAL).
The cryptographic hash function HAVAL was proposed by Y. Zheng et al. in 1992 [19] . It takes an input value of arbitrary length and digests it into variant lengths of 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits. In this paper, we present a new second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL with probability 2 −114 and devise a second preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL, and a partial key recovery attack on HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL with 2 122 oracle queries, 5 · 2 32 memory bytes and 2 96 3-pass HAVAL computations. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe HAVAL, HMAC, NMAC, and notations. Next, we present a second preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL in Section 3 and apply it to recover a partial key of HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief description of the HAVAL hash function, the HMAC/NMAC algorithms and notations used in the paper.
Description of HAVAL
HAVAL produces hashes in different lengths of 128, 160, 192, 224 and 256 bits. It allows that users can choose the number of passes 3, 4 or 5, where each pass contains 32 steps. It computes the hashes in the following procedure:
-Padding: an inserted message is padded into a multiple of 1024 bits.
S be 1024-bit message blocks and each M i consists of 32 32-bit words, that is,
, where IV is the initial value.
The HAVAL compression function H processes 3, 4 or 5 passes. Let F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 and F 5 be the five passes and (D in , M ) be the input value of H, where D in is a 256-bit initial block and M is a 1024-bit message block. Then the output of the compression function D out can be computed in the following way. Table 1 .
Each pass employs a different Boolean function f i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and a different permutation function. The following f i is used in pass i:
Let ϕ i,j be the permutation function of the j-th pass of the i-pass HAVAL. Table 2 shows the ϕ i,j used in each pass. In each step, the updated value a i is computed as
where X ≫ i is the right cyclic rotation of X by i bits, and C is a constant. b−n , where K is an n-bit key. The opad is formed by repeating the byte '0x36' as many times as needed to get a b-bit block, and the ipad is defined similarly using the byte '0x5c'.
, where M i is a b bit message. Let g be a padding method, g(x) = x||10 t ||bin 64 (x), where t is the smallest non-negative integer such that g(x) is a multiple of b and bin i (x) is the i-bit binary representation of x. Then, NMAC and HMAC are defined as follows: 
Notations
Let M and M be 1024-bit messages such that
32-bit words. We denote by a i (resp., a i ) the updated value of the i-th step using the message M (resp., M ). Let t i (resp., t i ) be the output value of the Boolean function of the i-th step using the message M (resp., M ). The j-th bits of a i and t i are denoted a i,j and t i,j . Additionally, we use several following notations in our attacks, where 0 ≤ j ≤ 31.
3 Second Preimage Attack on 3-Pass HAVAL
In this section, we show how to construct a second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL. Using this differential path, we find a second preimage of 3-pass HAVAL with probability 2 −114 , i.e., for a given message M , we find another message M with probability 2
, where H is 3-pass HAVAL. Our differential path of 3-pass HAVAL is stronger than the previous ones [7, 9, 11, 12] against the second preimage attack.
Second Preimage Differential Path of 3-Pass HAVAL

Let two 1024-bit message blocks
31 . Then we can use these two messages to construct a second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL with probability 2
−114 . Table 3 shows our second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL, which has been constructed as follows.
First of all, from the message pair we get the input difference to the 23-rd step (∆a 15 , ∆a 16 , ∆a 17 , ∆a 18 , ∆a 19 
is the input state to the i-th step. We assume that the output differences of the Boolean functions from the 23-rd step to the 36-th step are all zeroes. Then we can obtain the input difference to the 37-th step is (0, a 30 [20], 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). It is easy to see that the required assumption works if several conditions hold in our differential, which we call sufficient conditions. For example, consider a difference ∆t 24 . The input difference to the 24-th step is (∆a 16 , ∆a 17 , ∆a 18 , ∆a 19 , ∆a 20 , ∆a 21 , ∆a 22 , ∆a 23 19, 31 . If a 18,31 = 0, then the difference of a 22,31 does not have effect on the output difference of the Boolean function and thus ∆t 24 = 0. Thus, a 18,31 = 0 is one of the sufficient conditions. We show ,28  0  0  23  19  56  0  21  0  0  -27,28  0  0  23  19  21  57  0  0  0  -27,28  0  0  23  19  21  -14,15  58  0  -23 -27,28  0  0  23  19  21  -14,15  0  59  0  0  0  0  23  19  21  -14,15  0  0  60  0  0  0  23  19  21  -14,15  0  0  0  61  0  -19  23  19  21  -14,15  0  0  0  0  62  0  -15  19  21  -14, Table 5 of appendix all the sufficient conditions which satisfy our differential path . In order to compute the probability that a message M satisfies the sufficient conditions listed in Table 5 , we need to check the dependency of the conditions. To make the problem easier we first solve and simplify the conditions. In this process we may reduce the number of the sufficient conditions. Consider the conditions on the 20-th bit from the 31-st step to the 37-th step in Table 5 . Table 6 in appendix collects all the simplified conditions for those of Table  5 . We notice that the number of the sufficient conditions listed in Table 6 is 112, which seems to make the probability that a message satisfy all these conditions is 2 −112 . However, it is not 2 −112 , but approximately 2 −114 . This is due to the fact that there are still dependencies in some conditions. For example, consider the conditions on the 13-th bit from the 38-th step to the 41-st step in Table 4 . In the 39-th step, the probability that a 33,13 = a 35,13 is satisfied is 2 −1 since a 33,13 is used only in the 39-th step. In the 40-th and 41-st steps, if a 35,13 = 0, then a 39, 13 and a 34,13 should be 0 and 1, respectively, and a 40,13 is either 0 or 1. The probability that a 35,13 = 0 and a 34,13 = 1 hold is 1 4 (one out of four cases, see Table 4 ). Thus the probability that a 34, 13 13 . However, this is a contradiction to the condition of the 38-th step (see Table 4 ), and thus if a 35,13 = 1, then a 39,13 = 0, a 40,13 = 1 and a 34,13 = 1. The probability that a 35,13 = 1 and a 34,13 = 1 hold is 1 4 by Table 4 and each probability of a 39,13 = 0 and a 40,13 = 1 is 1 2 , so the probability that (a 34,13 , a 35,13 , a 39,13 , a 40,13 ) = (1, 1, 0, 1) is 1 16 . Therefore, we can compute the probability that the conditions in the 40-th and 41-st step hold is In this way, we analyze the probability that the sufficient conditions in Table 6 are satisfied is 2 −114 . 
Attack on 3-Pass HAVAL
The second preimage resistance on a hash function plays an important role to block the attacker to produce a second preimage when a meaningful and sensitive message (e.g. a finance-related message) is used. In literature, it is defined as follows:
Second preimage resistance on a hash function H. for any given message M , it is computationally infeasible to find another message M satisfying
It follows that the second preimage attack on a hash function exists if for a given message M there is an algorithm that finds another message M such that H(M ) = H(M ) with probability larger than 2 −n , where n is the bit-length of hash values. The second preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL works due to our differential path; -For a given message M , the probability that M holds the sufficient conditions listed in Table 6 is 2 −114 . -If the message M holds the sufficient conditions, then the message M which only differs from M at the most significant bit of the 22-nd message word has a same hash value.
Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-3-Pass HAVAL
In this section, we present partial key recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL, which works based on our differential path described in Section 3.
More precisely, we show how to find the partial key K 1 of NMAC-3-pass HAVAL and f (K ⊕ ipad) of HMAC-3-pass HAVAL (note that knowing f (K ⊕ ipad) and f (K ⊕ opad) allows to compute the MAC value for any message). Since HMAC = NMAC if f (K ⊕ipad) = K 1 and f (K ⊕opad) = K 2 , we focus on the NMAC-3-pass HAVAL attack which finds K 1 with message/MAC pairs. Recall that K 1 is placed at the position of the initial state in NMAC. This implies that recovering the initial value of 3-pass HAVAL is equivalent to getting the partial key K 1 of NMAC-3-pass HAVAL.
The main idea behind of our attack is that the attacker can recover the initial state of NMAC-3-pass HAVAL (in our attack it is K 1 ) if he knows a 256-bit input value at any step of 3-pass HAVAL. This idea has firstly been introduced in [4] . In this section, we first find a 16 , a 18 , a 21 and a 23 which are used as a part of an input value to the 24-th step. Remaining four-word input values a 17 , a 19 , a 20 and a 22 to the 24-th step is then found by 2 128 exhaustive searches. Let a i,j be the j-th bit of a i and γ i = (a i−8 ≫ 11) (t i ≫ 7) C, where C is a constant used in step i (note
The value a 16 is then revealed by the following Algorithm.
Algorithm 1. In order to recover the value a 16 , we use a condition a 16,31 = 0 depicted in Table 6 . The procedure goes as follows:
1. The attacker has access to the oracle O (=NMAC-3-pass HAVAL) and makes 2 121 queries for 2 120 message pairs 31 . However, this difference value can be canceled by the output difference of the Boolean function in the 31-st step. In this procedure, each of steps 24-31 requires one more additional condition, leading to total 8 additional conditions. Thus, the probability that the message pair (M, M ) has a same MAC value is not a random probability but 2 −121 , where the most significant bits of a 16 ), (note that in the group of the message pairs such that msb(γ 16 M 16 ) = 1 there are on average half message pairs satisfying the actual a 16,31 = 0). Since the probability that a wrong γ 16 does not cause any collision pair is (1 − 2 −113 )
(≈ e −32 ) < 2 −32 , we expect that there is no wrong γ 16 which leads to no collision in Step 2. Hence, we can determine the right γ 16 . To summarize, Algorithm 1 requires 2 121 oracle queries (in Step 1) and 2 32 memory bytes (the memory complexity of this attack is dominated by the counters for γ 16 ).
Next, we show how to recover the value a 18 , for which we use the condition a 18,31 = 0 required in our differential. Since there is no condition on a 17 (see Table 6 ), the attacker chooses any message word M 17 . The main idea is similar to Algorithm 1.
First of all, the attacker selects 2 119 message pairs (M, M ) that have the message difference given in Table 6 , where 16 should be the same as those selected in Algorithm 1, which leads to a 16,31 = 0), M 18 and M 18 vary in all 2 32 possible values, and 2 87 message pairs in the remaining words are randomly chosen. Once the attacker gets the corresponding MAC pairs, he performs Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1 to recover a 18 by setting γ 18 , M 18 , a 18 instead of γ 16 , M 16 and a 16 . The reason why recovering a 18 requires half of the message pairs, compared to when recovering a 16 , is that this attack algorithm exploits message pairs satisfying a 16,31 = 0 from the beginning. It increases by twice the probability that our differential holds. The remaining analysis is the same as that of Algorithm 1. To summarize, recovering a 18 requires 2 120 oracle queries.
Next, let us see how to recover a 21 . In order to recover a 21 we need to use the condition a 20,31 = a 21,31 , which is of a different form from the previous two conditions a 16 ,31 = a 18,31 = 0. However, the core in our attack is that a 20,31 is always a same value if Reducing the number of the 3-pass HAVAL computations. As described above, our partial key-recovery attack is completed by two phases; the first phase is to recover some portions of the 256-bit input value at step i, and the second is the exhaustive search phase for its remaining input bits. If we apply our attack to the input value to step 29 instead of step 24, then we can recover a 21 , a 23 , a 24 , a 26 and a 28 from the first phase with 2 122 oracle queries and we recover the remaining a 22 , a 25 and a 27 with 2 96 3-pass HAVAL computations from the second phase.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL with probability 2 −114 and exploited it to devise a second preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL, and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-3-pass HAVAL with 2 122 oracle queries, 5 · 2 32 memory bytes and 2 96 3-pass HAVAL computations. We expect that our attacks would be useful for the further analysis of HAVAL and HMAC/NMAC-HAVAL (e.g., full key-recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-HAVAL).
A Sufficient Conditions of the Second Preimage
Differential Path of 3-Pass HAVAL Table 5 shows the sufficient conditions of the second preimage differential path of 3-pass HAVAL, which are derived from the property of the Boolean function f i of appendix B. We solve and simplify the conditions of Table 5 and list the solutions in Table 6 . 
